
Rnnk .B4 Fl 




Major-General JOHN STARK 






AT 



l^nntngtntt 



By Herbert D. Foster with the Collaboration 

/I 

OF Thomas W. Sitreeter 



WITH 

REMINISCEJ^CES OF GENEEAL STARK 

ELD. JAMES RANDALL 

GE]^. JOHIN^ STARK 

ROBERT R. LAW 

THE BATTLE OF BEXXTX GTOA^ 

DR. WILLIAM O. STILLMAN 



MANCHESTEK, N. H. 

STANDARD BOOK COMPANY 

1918 






^^ 






^fje Seattle of 2^ennington 

By Dr. William 0. Stillman 



The following extracts are taken from an address delivered by Dr. 
Stillman before the New York Historical Association at its annual meet- 
ing in the court house at Lake George, August i6, 1904. The parts 
om.itted consist mainly of his plea for a monument in New York state to 
commemorate the battle. — Editor. 

/^J^B^O-DAY is the anniversary of an heroic battle of 
' Vj I ^ the American Revolution, which marked the 
^^^ turning point in that memorable contest which 
has stood for so much in the annals of the world. For the 
first time the untried and untrained settlers, fighting for 
home and liberty, prevailed decisively against the veteran 
legions of Europe. Hitherto this had been deemed an 
impossibility. It is the conquering of such impossibilities 
which always brings glory. 

As the result of the bloody conflict on the banks of 
the Walloomsac on that "memorable day," the Americans 
captured according to the statement of General Stark, 
their commander, in his report to General Gates, dated 
August 22, 1777, seven hundred prisoners (including the 
wounded) and counted two hundred and seven of enemy 
dead on the field of battle. Stark stated his own losses to 
have been "about forty wounded and thirty killed." 

When we consider that Burgoyne gave one thousand 
and fifty as the total British force engaged in this battle 
under Cols. Baum and Brayman, and that the Americans 
captured or killed over nine hundred men, and seized 
several hundred muskets and all the British cannon, the 
overwhelming character of the victory is apparent. Its 
importance was, however, greater in its moral than in its 
immediate physical effects. 

173 



174 THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON 

Lord George Germain, the British Minister in charge 
of the war in the States, characterized Burgoyne's raid 
toward Bennington as ''fatal" to the English and pro- 
nounced it as "the cause of all the subsequent misfortunes." 
General Burgoyne^ in his review of the evidence produced at 
at the inquiry before the House of Commons (see A State 
of the Expedition from Canada, as laid before the House 
of Commons, by Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, published 
London, 1780, page 108) indignantly denies the force of 
this charge, saying that in was '*a common accident of war, 
independent of any general action, unattended by any loss 
that could affect the main strength of the army, and little 
more than a miscarriage of a foraging party." He scouts 
the idea that it could ''have been fatal to a whole cam- 
paign." General Burgoyne seems to have forgotten that 
he had written to Lord George Germain, long before, a 
letter marked ''private," from his camp at Saratoga, under 
date of August 20, 1777, in which he said, "In regard to 
the affair of Saintcoick (Walloomsac), . . . Had I succeeded, 
1 should have affected a junction with St. Leger, and been 
now before Albany. . . . Had my instructions been fol- 
lowed . . . success would probably have ensued, mis- 
fortune would certainly have been avoided. I did not 
think it prudent, in the present crisis, to mark these cir- 
cumstances to the public so strongly as I do in confidence 
to your Lordship." There is more to the same effect. 

If this stroke of fortune brought consternation to the 
English it brought hope and happiness to the Colonists. 
"One more such stroke," said Washington when informed 
of the defeat of the royalists, "and we shall have no great 
cause for anxiety as to the future designs of Britain:" In 
writing Putnam he expressed the hope that New England 
would rise and crush Burgoyne's entire army. It is a 
curious instance of Washington's almost prophetic instinct 
that he had been longing for just this sort of a misfortune 
to seize the enemy, for on July 22, 1777, he had written to 
General Schuyler: "Could we be so happy as to cut off 



THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON 175 

one of his (Burgoyne's) detachments, supposing it should 
not exceed four, five or six hundred men, it would inspirit 
the people and do away much of their present anxiety. In 
such an event they would lose sight of past misfortunes, 
fly to arms and afford every aid in their power." 

The battle on the Walloomsac aroused a patriotic 
furor throughout the states. Jefferson called it "the first 
link in the chain of successes which issued in the surrender 
at Saratoga." 

Within three days General Schuyler wrote Stark: 
/'The signal victory you have gained, and the severe loss 
the enemy have received, cannot fail of producing the 
most salutary results." Within a week the bells were 
ringing in Boston and Philadelphia, and the whole people 
devoutly gave thanks for this interposition of Divine pro- 
tection. St. Leger, the British general beleaguering Fort 
Stanwix on the far off Mohawk, also heard of it, and in 
spite of his bloody victory at Oriskany Creek, slunk off to 
the St. Lawrence. His dream of conquest and of the 
occupancy of Albany was ended. The gifted Baroness 
Riedesel, in Burgoyne's camp wrote: "This Unfortunate 
event paralyzed at once our operations." 

The effect of this great victory, on the Continental 
soldiers, was marvelous. The brave and daring Vermont 
troops, under Cols. Warner and Herrick, were emboldened 
to attack the royalists at Lake George Landing, with the 
result that the vessels were captured which might have 
afforded Burgoyne's army escape to Canada. Recruits 
began to flock to the Federal army on the upper Hudson. 
The New England troops soon joined them. The British 
depots of supplies of provisions were sought out and 
raided. Gradually the condition of the king's army grew 
more and more desperate. A thousand men lost at 
Walloomsac reduced their forces from 7,000 to 6,000, and 
the 4,000 Continental soldiers facing them was rapidly 
increased under the benign influences of success to nearly 
17,000 men (16,942 as given in General Gates' statement 
of October i6, 1777). 



176 THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON 

It will thus be seen that the battle on the Walloomsac 
was undoubtedly the turning point of British success in 
America. It gave the prestige and caused the delay of a 
month in Burgoyne's movements, which were necessary 
to make Gates' army strong enough to resist him. It 
made possible the great victory at Saratoga which deter- 
mined the destinies of a continent and is ranked along 
with Marathon and Hastings as one of the fifteen great 
battles of the world. 



The naming of battles goes largely, like the naming 
of babies, by favor and accident. At the Bennington 
anniversary on the year following the contest, the occur- 
rence was referred to by the secretary of the celebration 
as the "battle at Bennington," and it soon passed into his- 
tory as such. Bennington was the nearest large settle- 
ment and the plans for defense centered there. There 
were no large towns near at hand in New York. Flad a 
celebration been held near the scene of the strife in this 
state soon after this event, I doubt not it would have been 
christened the Battle of Walloomsac," just as Oriskany 
was named after the adjacent stream and Saratoga after 
the village close to which that fight occurred. It is a 
curious thing that neither Stark nor Burgoyne were accus- 
tomed to refer to the battle as that of Bennington. Stark 
several times characterized it, as I have indicated in the 
title selected for this address, as the ''battle at Walloom- 
sac," and Burgoyne more than once has referred to it as the 
"affair at Saint Coicks Mill," or plain "Saint Coicks," 
which was the spot where the first skirmish began and last 
fight ended. 

While New Hampshire furnished the commanding 
general, the sagacious and brave Stark, and more than 
half the troops, Massachusetts and Vermont divided the 
remaining part not so very unequally between them. New 
York furnished the battle field and a very considerable 



THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON 



177 



sprinkling of men besides. It should be borne in mind 
that every available man from that part of New York 
State was with the main American army before Burgoyne. 
Poor New York at this period was distracted. She was 




being ground between the upper and nether millstones at 
Saratoga and New York. King George III, on July 20, 
1764, by royal decree had declared that what is now Ver- 
mont was part of the Province of New York. Before that 
it had been by common consent considered a part of New 



178 THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON 

Hampshire. From 1765 to 1777 there had been a most 
bitter legal war, oftentimes threatening serious bloodshed, 
between the people of this section and the authorities in 
New York, who regarded the revolt against the King's 
grant as unwarranted. It was a sadly mixed quarrel with 
varying right and wrong on our part.* 

On January 15, 1777, Vermont declared her independ- 
ence and soon after adopted her present name, having first 
chosen New Connecticut, which was soon abandoned. 
She was therefore in a state of open rebellion against New 
York, and had declared herself a fourteenth State, which 
was not, however, as yet recognized by the other thirteen 
of the United States. 

In spite of this New York treated her with marked 
consideration. Colonel Warner and his regiment of Ver- 
monters, which were a regular part of the Continental 
army, were ordered by General Schuyler, of New York, to 
protect his home territory, in an order previous to July 14, 
1777. On July 15, General Schuyler sent to Colonel 
Warner an order for clothing for his troops in Vermont, of 
which they were very much in need, and also ^4,000 for 
their pay, which was all he could spare from his depleted 
treasury. On July 16, General Schuyler in writing Ira 
Allen, Secretary of the Vermont Council of Safety, 
stated that he had ordered Colonel Simmonds (who had 
some 400 or 500 men under him) from Massachusetts to 
his assistance. On the same date General Schuyler 
wrote to Colonel Warner, "I am this moment informed 
by Captain Fitch that the New Hampshire militia 
are marching to join me. It is (not) my intention, 
much as I am in want of troops, that they should come 
hither, as it would expose the country in that quarter to 
the depredations of the enemy. I therefore enclose you 
an order for them to join you." Thus the gallant Stark, 
whose name was even then a thing to conjure with, through 



*See Vermont Grants, Vol. 5 of Granite State Magazine. 



THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON 179 

the generosity of New York's wise General, the noble 
Philip Schuyler, came to the rescue of Vermont and saved 
the day at Walloomsac. Local differences were forgotten 
in the desire for the common good. Stark and Warner 
soon after the battle joined the main continental army on 
the Hudson, The services of Col. John Williams and his 
party, from New York State, who offered their services to 
Vermont at the time of the fight should not be forgotten. 

I have ventured to devote some little attention to the 
relation of New York to this famous battle, with an expla- 
nation of conditions which should make clearer the impor- 
tant part she played and the powerful forces which con- 
trolled and limited her action. Her position has been at 
times misunderstood if not misrepresented. 

These were truly times which tried men's souls. The 
territory involved in the war was honeycombed with 
treachery and defection. A straw was liable to turn the 
tide either way at this pivotal moment. If Baum had 
retired on his reserves at the proper time it is doubtful 
whether Stark's forces could have overcome the enemy 
before Burgoyne had given reinforcements in force as 
promised. 

If Baum's expedition had been delayed two or three 
days, Stark would in all probability have joined Schuyler 
and success would have crowned the British efforts. If 
Baum had pushed rapidly forward two days sooner, he 
would have found the patriots unprepared, have secured his 
provisions, and have completed his raid to Connecticut and 
Albany with success. St. Leger would not have been 
frightened off on the Mohawk, and Burgoyne would have 
forced his victorious march to Albany as anticipated. The 
destinies of a Continent were in the balance, and fortune 
and chance were playing a desperate game. Conditions 
were so bad that when the Vermont Council made its 
appeal to New Hampshire for assistance there was a per- 
ceptible chance of the entire state going over to the 
royalists. The Vermont Council used these significant 



180 



THE BATTLE OF BENNINGTON 



words: *'Our good disposition to defend ourselves and 
make a frontier for your State with our own cannot be car- 
ried into execution without your assistance. Should you 
send immediate assistance we can help you, and should you 
neglect till we are put to the necessity of taking protec- 
tion '(from the King's government)' you readily know it is 
in a moment out of our power to assist you." The die 
would have been cast. Vermont would have been obliged 
to have sworn allegiance to the English king or have been 
given over as the spoils of war to plunder. Sections had 
already accepted such protection. 

Such was the condition of things when the battle on 
the Walloomsac was fought. Truly great events turn on 
small hinges. Shall we, the inheritors of the benefactions 
of these auspicious happenings, refuse to erect a monu- 
ment in gratitude and patriotism to mark the spot where 
despotism in this favored land received a fatal blow and 
liberty became for our valiant sires something more than a 
hopeless dream. 




CATAMOUNT TAVERN 



^tark's! SInlrepenlJent Command at 
2^ennmgton 



By Herbert D. Foster, with the Collaboration of Thomas W. 

Streeter 







N THE 1 8th of July, twelve days after the Amer- 
icans abandoned Fort Ticonderoga, there was 
laid before the General Court of New Hamp- 
shire a vigorous appeal to aid "the defenceless inhabitants 
on the frontier" of Vermont, who "are heartily disposed to 
Defend their Liberties . . . and make a frontier for your 
State with their own." *'You will naturally understand 
that when we cease to be a frontier your state must take 
it," was the shrewd hint with which Ira Allen closed his 
letter. Seldom has there been made a speech with clearer 
vision and more immediate and lasting effect than was 
made on that day by Speaker John Langdon. In four 
ringing sentences, he put '*At the service of the State" 
his worldly goods of those days — "hard money," ''plate," 
and "Tobago Rum." Then he added this prophecy: 

**We can raise a brigade; and our friend Stark, who 
so nobly sustained the honor of our arms at Bunker's Hill, 
may safely be entrusted with the command, and we will 
check Burgoyne." 

With this pledge and prophecy, New Hampshire began 
her share in the campaign which made Bennington and 
Saratoga possible. On that same day the first part of the 
prophecy was fulfilled by the election of John Stark as 
Brigadier General. Before a month had passed, "our 
friend Stark" had fulfilled the remainder; he had raised a 
brigade, and he had "checked Burgoyne" at Bennington. 

181 



1S2 STARK's command at BENNINGTON' 

How the Battle of Bennington was won is an interest- 
ing tale; but it has been told often and well, by the victors^ 
by the vanquished, by the critics of both, and finally by 
the critics of one another. The object of this paper, 
therefore, is not to describe the battle, but rather to show 
how there came to be an American force at Bennington 
capable of fighting any battle. 

A score of the participants in the battle, and more 
than a score of the participants in what we may venture to 
call the campaign of Bennington, have left us fragments 
of the story. These fragments, printed and unprinted, 
have been collected by the writers of this article and put 
together into a daily record from the pen of the partici- 
pants—American, British, and German. These contestants 
reveal, in their sequence, the actions and motives of both 
parties in the struggle. Their combined daily record 
sheds somewhat more of the white light of truth, or at 
least the gray light of history, on the causes and results 
of Stark's Independent Command, which proved such a 
vital factor in the campaign. From the participants we 
may hope to glean a clearer and therefore juster idea of 
why the independent command was granted by New 
Hampshire; second, how it enabled Stark to carry out the 
sound strategy once planned by Schuyler, always approved 
by Washington, and fortunately insisted upon by Stark and 
the Vermont Council; and third, how it was regarded by 
Stark's fellow soldiers and citizens, by the Continental 
officers, and by Congress. 

On the 1 8th of July, after John Langdon's speech. 
New Hampshire, under extraordinary circumstances took 
unusual action which gave rise to much discussion and 
criticism. The General Court appointed *'the Hon^^^ Wil- 
liam Whipple Esq." and "the Hon^^ John Stark Esq." 
Brigadier Generals, and voted ''that the said Brigadier 
Generals be always amenable for their conduct to the Gen- 
eral Court or Committee of Safety for the time being." 
It is the omission that is significant: Stark was not made 



STARK's command at BENNINGTON 183 

«*amenable" to Congress, to the officers of the Continental 
Army, or to continental regulations. 

The reasons which led New Hampshire to give Stark 
this independent command are set forth clearly in an 
unpublished letter of Josiah Bartlett, written a month 
after the battle was fought. Bartlett was a member of the 
General Court which appointed Stark, and of the New 
Hampshire Committee of Safety which gave him his 
instructions; and after the Battle of Bennington, he was 
sent to advise Stark. Bartlett was also a Colonel in the 
New Hampshire militia, had twice represented his state in 
Congress, and later was to serve her as a Chief Justice 
and as Governor. Because of his intimate knowledge of 
state affairs, his wide experience, and his sound judgment, 
the following opinions are entitled to unusual confidence. 

**I am much Surprized to hear the uneasiness Ex- 
pressed by the Congress at the orders given him, [Stark] by 
this state; I think it must be owing to their not Knowing 
our Situation at that time. The Enemy appeared to be 
moving down to our frontiers and no man to oppose them 
but the militia and Col. Warners Regiment not Exceeding 
150 men, and it was impossible to raise the militia to be 
under the Command of Gen^^ in whom they had no Confi- 
dence, and who might immediately call them to the South- 
ward and leave their wives and families a prey to the 
enemy: and had Gen^ Starks gone to Stillwater agreable 
to orders; there would have been none to oppose Col 
Baum in carrying Gen^ Burgoine's orders into Execution: 
No State wishes more Earnestly to keep up the union than 
New Hampshire, but Surely Every State has a right to 
raise their militia for their own Defence against the Com- 
mon Enemy and to put them under such Command as 
they shall think proper without giving just cause of uneasi- 
ness to the Congress. As to the State giving such orders 
to Gen^ Starks, because he had not the rank he thought 
himself entitled to, (which seems to be intimated) I can 
assure you is without foundation and I beUeve never 



184r stark's command at benningtqn 

entered the mind of any of the Committee of Safety who 
gave the orders; however I hope by this time the Congress 
are convinced of the upright intentions of the State and 
the propriety of their conduct. . . ." 

No more convincing statement of the reasons for 
granting the independent command could be given to-day. 
The only query is: do the facts substantiate Bartlett's 
statements as to the causes and results of the independ- 
ent command? 

The statement as to the lack of confidence in the 
generals of the Northern Department is only too amply 
substantiated. "The people are disgusted, disappointed and 
alarmed/' wrote the New York Council of Safety on the 27th 
of July, to the New Hampshire Committee of Safety. To 
General Putnam even more explicitly they wrote: "The 
evacuation of Ticonderoga appears to the Council highly 
reprehensible . . . absurd and probably criminal." "I 
. . . agree with you," replied the Chairman of the New 
Hampshire Committee, "that the loss of Ticonderoga, in 
the manner it was left, has occasioned the loss of all confi- 
dence, among the people in these parts, in the general offi- 
cers of that department." The investigations by Con- 
gress, the letters of Washington, John Adams, Samuel 
Adams, Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., Van Cortlandt, and of 
less known soldiers and civilians show that the distrust was 
deep and widespread. Schuyler himself, the commander 
of the Northern Department, finding himself at Fort 
Edward "at the head of a handful of men — not above 
fifteen hundred," and "the country in the deepest conster- 
nation," wrote to Washington: "what could induce the 
general officers to a step which has ruined our affairs in 
this quarter, God only knows." The loss of confidence 
was the more dangerous because known and reckoned on 
by the enemy. Philip Skene, Burgoyne's Tory adviser, 
wrote to Lord Dartmouth on the 15th of July: "The men 
want confidence in their officers and their Off""^ in their 
men." "The King," says Walpole, "on receiving the 



X. 



STARK's command at BENNINGTON 185 

account of taking Ticonderoga, ran into the Queen's room 
crying, 'I have beat them! beat all the Americans!' " 

There may have been much prejudice and misunder- 
standing involved in the distrust of the general officers, 
and in the case of Schuyler there undoubtedly was, for he 
has been amply vindicated as a brave and capable officer 
accomplishing a thankless task under peculiarly difficult 
circumstances. The distrust was, however, so widespread 
and ineradicable, and the danger so pressing, that decisive 
measures had to be adopted. 

With Stark's acceptance of an independent command, 
the situation changed at once. The enthusiasm was so 
great that the rapidity of recruiting and enlisting seems 
almost incredible. On the very day of Stark's appoint- 
ment. Captain McConnell of Pembroke, a delegate to the 
Assembly, '^engaged" for the service. The next day, the 
19th of Augi*st, he, and Captain Bradford of Amherst and 
Captain Parker of New Ipswich, some sixty miles from 
Exeter, had recruited three companies of 221 men. The 
news swept up the Merrimack valley on Sunday the 20th 
of July, through Hudson and Hollis, Londonderry and 
Epsom, Loudon and Boscawen, to Salisbury, fifty-eight 
miles distant from Exeter, where Ebenezer Webster, 
father of Daniel Webster, raised his company of fifty- 
four men. 

*^As soon as it was decided to raise volunteer com- 
panies and place them under the command of Gen. Stark, 
Col. Hutchins [delegate from Concord] mounted his horse, 
and travelling all night with all possible haste, reached 
Concord on Sabbath afternoon, before the close of public 
service. Dismounting at the meeting-house door, he 
walked up the aisle of the church while Mr. Walker was 
preaching. Mr. Walker paused in his sermon, and said — 
'Col. Hutchins, are you the bearer of any message.?' 'Yes,' 
replied the Colonel: 'Gen. Burgoyne, with his army, is on 
his march to Albany. Gen. Stark has offered to take the 
command of the New Hampshire men: and, if we all turn 



186 Stark's command at bennington 

out, we can cut off Burgoyne's march.' Whereupon Rev. 
Mr. Walker said — 'My hearers, those of you who are will- 
ing to go, better leave at once.' At which word all the 
men in the meeting-house rose and went out. Many 
immediately enlisted. The whole night was spent in 
preparation, and a company was ready to march next day." 
There must have been many similar scenes on that Sun- 
day of recruiting, for before it ended seven companies of 
419 men were enlisted. 

On the third day of recruiting, seven more companies, 
numbering 390 men, volunteered under Captains from 
Chester and Pelham in the southeast; from Lyndeboro; 
and then, on the other side of the watershed, from 
Rindge, from Walpole and from Charlestown, one hundred 
and ten miles to the northwest on the Connecticut; and 
from Plymouth nearly as for distant on the northern fron- 
tier, Five more companies numbering 252 men, enUsted 
on the next day, the 22nd of July, under Captains from 
Hopkinton, Gilmanton, and Sanbornton in the Merrimack 
region, and from Gilsum and Chesterfield in the southwest 
in the Connecticut basin. On the 23d of July, two com- 
panies enlisted under Captains from Chesterfield in the 
southwestern corner and from Hanover on the northwest- 
ern frontier; and on the following day the last vof the 
twenty-five companies was recruited. 

In these six days of recruiting, from the 19th to the 
24th of July, 1,492 officers and men had enlisted to serve 
under Stark, and many of them had already begun their 
march to join him. The number of volunteers is the more 
remarkable, if we remember that in the sparsely settled 
state, with its scattered hamlets, most of them settled in 
the last generation, there were only 15,436 polls, accord- 
ing to the returns of that year. This would mean that 
nearly one man in ten of a voting age volunteered. In 
many of the towns more than ten per cent, of the 
males over sixteen years old volunteered. In half a 
dozen towns taken at random in different sections of 



Stark's command at bennington 187 

the state, there enlisted on an average over fifteen per 
cent. In Chesterfield, out of 221 males over sixteen, 
twenty-one volunteered, or g% per cent.; in Hanover, 9.8 
per cent.; in Concord, over ten per cent.; in Swanzey, 12 
per cent.; in Candia, 25 per cent.; and in Salisbury under 
Captain Ebenezer Webster, forty-one men volunteered, or 
over 36 per cent, of the male population over sixteen years 
old. 

Three facts explain this almost incredible swiftness of 
enlistment: first, the spreading of the news through the 
return of the delegates from the three days' session at 
Exeter; second, the payment of ''advanced wages"; and 
third, the eagerness to enlist under Stark. The people, 
especially the militia, may have suggested such action and 
consequently may have been expecting some such news; 
this is at least a plausible hypothesis which makes intelli- 
gible the rapid enlistment immediately on the return of the 
representatives like Col. Hutchins of Concord, and Mat- 
thew Patten of Bedford. There were nearly 1,500 men 
like Thomas Mellen, who said: 'T enlisted ... as soon as 
I heard that Stark would accept the command of the state 
troops." The militia knew that Stark and the State of 
New Hampshire meant business, and they gave a business- 
like response. 

The promptness of enlistment is matched and doubt- 
less aided by Stark's characteristic rapidity of movement. 
On the 1 8th of July, Stark was appointed at Exeter. On 
the igth, he received from the Chairman of the Committee 
of Safety, the following instructions; 

''State of New Hampshire, Saturday, July I9t^ 1777. 

To Brig^ Gen^ Jn^ Stark, — You are hereby required to 
repair to Charlestown, N^ 4, so as to be there by the 24^^^ — 
Thursday next, to meet and confer with persons appointed 
by the Convention of the State of Vermont relative to the 
route of the Troops under your Command, their being 
supplied with provisions, and future operations — and when 



188 stark's command at bennington 

the troops are collected at N^ 4, you are to take the Com- 
mand of them and march into the State of Vermont, and 
there act in conjunction with the Troops of that State, or 
any other of the States, or of the United States, or sepa- 
rately, as it shall appear Expedient to you for the protec- 
tion of the People or the annoyance of the Enemy, and 
from time to time as occasion shall require, send Intelli- 
gence to the Gen^ Assembly or Committee, of Safety, of 
your operations, and the manoeuvers of the Enemy. 

M. WEARE." 

While his Brigade was enlisting, Stark was crossing 
the State to the appointed rendezvous at Charlestown on 
the Connecticut River. He probably kept his appoint- 
ment there on the 24th of July; on the 25th he was cer- 
tainly at a point only two or three days distant by post 
from Manchester, Vermont, and other letters would indi- 
cate that this point was Charlestown. On the 28th he 
"forwarded 250 men to their relief," that is to the Vermont 
militia at Manchester. On the 30th, he wrote from 
Charlestown: "^'I sent another detachment of [f] this day." 
For his swiftly gathering force, he had to provide "Kettles 
or utensils to cook our victuals as the Troops has not 
brought any," cannon and their carriages, bullets, and even 
**bullet moulds, as there is but one pair in town." As he 
prepared to cross into Vermont, he thoughtfully asked the 
New Hampshire Committee for "Rum ... as there is 
none of that article in them parts where we are a going." 
By the 2d of August, two weeks after his appointment, "he 
had sent off from No. 4, 700 men to join Colo. Warner at 
Manchester," and intended to "follow them the next day 
( . . . Sunday) with 300 more; and had .ordered the 
remainder to follow him as fast as they came into No. 4" 
[Charlestown]. His last recorded acts before leaving the 
state were provisions for the physical and spiritual welfare 
of his troops in letters from Charlestown on the 3d of 
August to his "Chirurgeon," "DoC" Solomon Chase" of 



STARK's command at BENNINGTON 189 

Cornish, and to the Brigade Chaplain, "Rev. Mr. Hibbard 
at Claremont," a graduate of Dartmouth in the class of 
1772. 

On the 6th of August, Stark was in the Green Moun- 
tains at Bromley, near Peru, Vermont, sending back word 
to Charlestown ''to fix them cannon . . . for your defence 
. . . forward, with all convenient speed, all the rum and 
sugar . . . get all the cannon from Walpole." Swiftly as 
Stark and his brigade moved forward, he seems to have 
forgotten nothing necessary for the troops at the front or 
for those left behind to guard the stores. He was a "good 
provider" as well as a good fighter. The rum he secured 
from his friends; the cannon he captiired from the enemy. 

On the 7th of August, he had crossed the Green 
Mountains and joined Warner and General Lincoln at 
Manchester near the western border of Vermont. In 
twenty days Stark had more than fulfilled the first part of 
Langdon's prophecy — he had not only raised a brigade, he 
had also equipped his volunteers, and marched them across 
two states. Two days later, the 9th of August, he was at 
Bennington, where within a week he was to realize the 
remainder of Langdon's patriotic vision and "check Bur- 
goyne." It is not surprising that this characteristic swift- 
ness and energy of Stark attracted volunteers and infused 
hope and an entirely new spirit into the troops of all the 
region. 

The contrast with Burgoyne's slow progress made 
Stark's rapidity seem the more striking. When Stark was 
appointed at Exeter, Burgoyne was at "Skeensborough 
House," on the present site of Whitehall, New York. By 
the time Stark had crossed New Hampshire and mustered 
his troops on the Connecticut River, Burgoyne had 
marched only twenty-eight miles southward to Fort 
Edward on the Hudson. While Stark was crossing Ver- 
mont, and organizing his brigade at Manchester and Ben- 
nington, Burgoyne and his army were delaying at Fort 
Edward where they remained until the 14th of August. 



190 STARK's command at BENNINGTON 

It was two weeks before the British army, hampered by 
the untiring efforts of Schuyler and by the difficulties of 
transportation, were able to advance seven miles down the 
Hudson to Fort Miller. 

A clear understanding of the position of the combat- 
ants on the 7th of August is necessary to comprehend the 
later plans and movements. Of the American forces, on 
the 7th of August, Stark was at Manchester, Vermont, 
with Warner and Lincoln; Schuyler, who had been grad- 
ually withdrawing southward before Burgoyne's slow 
advance, had been since the 4th of August at Stillwater on 
the Hudson, "about twenty miles west of Bennington." 
The British forces were situated as follows: Burgoyne was 
at Fort Edward, twenty-five to thirty miles north of 
Schuyler; St. Leger, slowly moving down the Mohawk val- 
ley to join Burgoyne, had been delayed by the siege of 
Fort Stanwix, and on the 7th of August, the day after the 
battle of Oriskany, demanded the surrender of the Fort 
and received a sturdy refusal. Bearing in mind these posi- 
tions of the four commanders on the 7th of August — Stark 
at Manchester, Schuyler at Stillwater, Burgoyne at Fort 
Edward, and St. Leger at Fort Stanwix — we are prepared 
to discuss Schuyler's two different plans of campaign, and 
the strategic value of Stark's independent command. 

Schuyler, until the 4th of August had approved the 
plan of retaining troops at Manchester or Bennington to 
fall upon Burgoyne's rear. On the 15th of July he there- 
fore sent reinforcements to Warner. Two days later, he 
ordered the Massachusetts militia "to march to the relief 
of Colo. Warner and put themselves under his command. 
He is in the vicinity of Bennington." The 19th of July, 
he urged the New Hampshire militia to "hasten your march 
to join" Warner who "has intelligence that a considerable 
body of the enemy will attempt to penetrate to Benning- 
ton." On the 29th of July, Schuyler sent General Benja- 
min Lincoln of Massachusestts "to take command on the 
Grants." In his letter of this date to Warner, Schuyler 



STARK's command at BENNINGTON 191 

expressed his hopes that "the Body under General Stark 
will be respectable"; and that General Lincoln . . . will 
be able to make a powerful diversion." His letter of the 
i6th of July to Warner is worth quoting in full as a clear 
exposition of Schuyler's original plan. 

**Fort Edward, July i6, 1777. 
To Colo Warner 

Sir I am this moment informed by Capt Fitch that the 
New Hampshire Militia are marching to join me. It is 
not my intention, much as I am in want of troops, that 
they should come hither as it would expose the country in 
that quarter to the depredations of the Enemy: I there- 
fore enclose you an order for them to join you if none 
are arrived, you will send express for them. I hope when 
they come you will be able, if not to attack the Enemy, at 
least to advance so near as to bring off the well affected 
and to secure the Malignants. 
I am Sir 

Your most hum: Serv 

PH SCHUYLER" 

Schuyler communicated this plan to Washington on 
the 2 1st and 22d of July and received the following 
approval of his measures: 

"You intimate the propriety of having a body of men 
stationed somewhere about the Grants. The expediency 
of such a measure appears to me evident; for it would cer- 
tainly make General Burgoyne very circumspect in his 
advances if it did not wholly prevent them. It would keep 
him in continual anxiety for his rear . . . and would serve 
many other valuable purposes." 

Washington continued to urge the retention of troops 
on the Vermont border, even after Schuyler abandoned the 
plan. On the i6th of August, the very day when Stark's 
victory at Bennington demonstrated the wisdom of the 
advice of the Commander-in-Chief, Washington wrote to 
Governor Clinton of New York: 



192 stark's command at bennington 

'•F'rom some expressions in a letter, which I have 
seen, written by General Lincoln to General Schuyler, I 
am led to infer, it is in contemplation to unite all the 
militia and continental troops in one body, and make an 
opposition wholly in front. If this is really the intention, 
I should think it a very ineligible plan. An enemy can 
always act with more vigor and effect, when they have 
nothing to apprehend for their flanks and rear, than when 
they have. ... If a respectable body of men were to be 
stationed on the Grants, it would undoubtedly have the 
effects intimated above, would render it not a little difficult 
for General Burgoyne to keep the necessary communica- 
tion open; and they would frequently afford opportunities 
of intercepting his convoys, ... These reasons make it 
clearly my opinion, that a sufficient body of militia should 
always be reserved in a situation proper to answer these 
purposes. If there should be more collected, than is 
requisite for this use, the surplusage may with propriety 
be added to the main body of the army. I am not, how- 
ever, so fully acquainted with every cicumstance, that 
ought to be taken into consideration, as to pretend to do 
anything more than to advise in the matter. Let those on 
the spot determine and act as appears to them most 
prudent." 

Now it was exactly in accord with this sound and 
repeated advice of Washington, and in pursuance of the 
original plan of Schuyler himself, that Stark and the Ver- 
mont Council of Safety, "those on the spot," proposed to 
act. Schuyler, on the other hand, abandoned this plan of 
a flank attack, when he found the enemy pressing closer 
.upon the main body of his own army. He thereupon 
ordered all the militia on the Vermont frontier to join him 
at Stillwater on the Hudson. Consequently, when Stark 
arrived at Manchester, Vermont, on the 7th of August, he 
found that his own brigade had, without his knowledge, 
been ordered to Stillwater and had begun their preparation 
for the march. 



STARK's command at BENNINGTON 193 

The first evidence of Schuyler's change of plan is on 
the 3d of August, the day when St. Leger appeared before 
Fort Stanwix or Schuyler. By that time, Schuyler was 
aware in general of this approach of hostile troops from 
the west down the Mohawk valley on his left flank. He 
also keenly realized that Burgoyne was "making every 
exertion to move down" the Hudson to attack the Amer- 
ican center. Schuyler therefore on the 3d of August, 
*'the generals having unanimously advised" him, fell back 
from Saratoga to Stillwater and on the next day called in 
the militia stationed in Vermont, on his right flank. On 
this 4th of August he wrote to Lincoln, who was then at 
Manchester: 

*'In all probability he [Burgoyne] has left nothing at 
Skenesborough, except what is so covered that it is not 
probable that your moving that way without artillery would 
give him any Alarm. I must desire you to march your 
whole Force, except Warner's Regiment and join me with 
all possible Dispatch." 

Five days later, on the 9th of August, Schuyler asked 
the Vermont militia also to join him, as Burgoyne's "whole 
force is pointed this way" and as "there is no great prob- 
ability that force will be sent your way until he shall have 
taken possession of this City" [Albany]. Schuyler writing 
from Albany was not well informed; he did not know that 
on the very day he wrote this, Baum received his instruc- 
tions from Burgoyne and started on his march toward Ben- 
nington. Schuyler did not realize the effect of his own 
wise policy of devastation and obstruction of the country 
through which the British army had to pass. He was 
deceived by Burgoyne's pretence of a movement down the 
Hudson. He failed to put himself in Burgoyne's place 
and see that the British, retarded by the obstacles in their 
front and by the difficulty of getting stores from their 
rear, would naturally attempt by a flank movement to cap- 
ture the horses, cattle, and provisions at Bennington, 
twenty-five miles away. It was "those on the spot," Stark 



194 stark's command at benntngton 

and the Vermont Council of Safety, who did realize both 
the likelihood of such an expedition and the possibilities 
of a counter-movement by the American militia stationed 
at Bennington. 

The critical period of the campaign preceding the bat- 
tle of Bennington is the week from the 7th to the 13th of 
August. In this week was decided the question whether 
the militia should all march to Stillwater, according to 
Schuyler's new plan; or whether they should remain on 
the Vermont border to execute the flank attack originally 
planned by Schuyler and advocated by Washington, Stark^ 
and the Vermont Council. Within this week Stark arrived 
at Manchester, assumed command of his brigade and 
marched to Bennington; with the aid of the Verm.ont 
Committee of Safety, he convinced Schuyler and Lincoln 
that the militia should not march directly to Stillwater, but 
should rather prepare for the attack on the enemy's flank; 
therefore on the 13th of August, Stark was ''on the spot" 
and ready to begin this attack when Baum appeared 
eighteen miles from Bennington. This question and its 
settlement are manifestly of supreme importance. Yet 
with all its importance the question of the plans and move- 
ments of all three generals has never been set forth with 
completeness in any one of the many accounts of the bat- 
tle or the campaign. This can now be done in the light of 
documents recently printed or discovered. 

By the 12th of August Schuyler appears reconverted 
to his original plan of attacking the enemy's flank 
and rear. The following explanation of the change is 
given in a sketch of Stark published the year of his death, 
in Farmer and Moore's Collections. This sketch of Stark 
was based on an account by Stark's son-in-law in 
N. H. Patriot, May 15, 18 10, and on particulars given by 
Stark's oldest son Caleb, who had been an adjutant in the 
Northern army, and who after the battle had carried to his 
father a message from General Gates. 



Stark's command at bennington 195 

"General Schuyler opened a correspondence with 
Stark, and endeavored to prevail on him to come to the 
Sprouts. The latter gave him a detail of his intended 
operations, viz., to fall upon the rear of Burgoyne, to 
harrass and cut off his supplies. General Schuyler 
approved the plan and offered to furnish him with five or 
six hundred men more to carry it into execution." 

The correspondence substantiates this statement; and 
indicates that Lincoln aided in bringing Stark and Schuyler 
into agreement on the basis of the original plan of a flank 
movement. From the 7th to the lOth of August, Lincoln 
was with Stark at Manchester and Bennington and corre- 
sponding with Schuyler. On the 12th, Lincoln was with 
Schuyler at Stillwater and wrote to Washington: "I am to 
return with the militia from the Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and the Grants, to the Northward, with a 
design to fall into the rear of Burgoyne." On the 14th, 
Lincoln wrote Stark from Half Moon, a few miles below 
Stillwater: "Your favor of yesterday's date, per express, I 
received on the road to this place. As the troops were not 
on the march, I am glad you detained them in Bennington. 
Our plan is adopted. I will bring with me camp kettles, 
Axes, ammunition and flints . . . You will please ts meet 
us, as proposed, on the morning of the i8th. If the 
enemy shall have possession of that place, and in your 
opinion it becomes improper for us to rendezvous there, 
you will be so good as to appoint another, and advise me of 
the place. . . ." 

Finally, the statements of the Patriot article of 1810, 
and of Farmer and Moore's Sketch of 1822 are fully con- 
firmed by the Trumbull Papers, published in 1902, and by 
an unprinted letter discovered in the present investigation. 
Schuyler transmitted to Lincoln on the 15th of August a 
letter received from Stark and added this endorsement: 
"You will see his determination and regulate yourself 
accordingly." "Gen. Lincoln is moved this day, with 
about 5 or 600 from our little army to fall in and co-oper- 



196 stark's command at bennington 

ate with Stafks," wrote Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., from 
Albany, on the 17th of August. 

This plan of attacking Burgoyne's rear and flank from 
Vermont must have been discussed by Stark and Lincoln 
when they were together between the 7th and loth of 
August. Schuyler's letters show that he reverted to this 
original plan between the 9th and 12th of August. Now 
this is just the time when Lincoln and Stark at Benning- 
ton were corresponding with Schuyler, and when Lincoln 
went in person from Stark to Schuyler. On the 12th of 
August, then, while Schuyler and Lincoln were together at 
Stillwater, Schuyler wrote to Warner a letter marked 
"secret": 

"A movement is intended from here with part of the 
Army to fall in the enemy's rear. You will therefore 
march your regiment and such of the militia and ranging 
Companies as you can speedily collect to the Northern 
part of the Cambridge District in this state where the 
troops from hence will be there to join you, so as to be 
there on the i8th at farthest." 

This gives the details of the plan which, as we have 
seen above, Lincoln communicated to Washington on the 
same day and from the same place. Further details of the 
same plan are given in Schuyler's letter of the following 
day, the 13th of August, to Lincoln: 

''You will please to take' command of the Troops that 
are now on the way from Bennington and march them to 
the East Side of Hudson's River to the Northern parts of 
Cambridge, where Col. Warner has orders to join you. 
Should you on your arrival at that place find it practicable, 
by coup de main, to make an Impression on any post the 
Enemy may occupy, you will, if there is a prospect of suc- 
cess, make the attempt." 

To this same plan of a combined flank attack, Lincoln 
evidently referred in his letter of the 14th of August, 
quoted above, in which he wrote Stark: 



Stark's command at bennington 197 

''Our plan is adopted . . . meet us as proposed. . . . 
If the enemy shall have possession of that place . . . 
appoint another." 

Finally, the agreement of the three generals on the 
plan is indicated in Schuyler's letter on the day of the 
battle of Bennington, the i6th day of August, to the 
Massachusetts council: 

"Lincoln . . . was at ten this Morning at Kalf Moon 
. , . and is by my orders, — going to join General Stark 
and try to make a diversion and draw off the Attention of 
the enemy by marching to the Northern parts of Cam- 
bridge, Vt. [New York] . . . Happily I have assurances 
from General Stark that he will not hesitate to do what 
is required." 

Unfortunately Schuyler and Lincoln agreed upon this 
flank attack too late to aid Stark in its execution. On the 
i6th of August they were still twenty miles away, on the 
banks of the Hudson, Schuyler planning ''to make a 
Diversion and draw off the Attention of the enemy," and 
Lincoln just starting with 500 or 600 men — on the very 
day when Stark won the battle of Bennington, before rein- 
forcements from the Continental army on the Hudson 
could reach him." 

On the 9th of August, Stark marched to Bennington 
instead of proceeding directly to Stillwater. On the same 
day Burgoyne played into his hands by detaching Baum on 
the expedition toward Bennington to "try the affection of 
the Country; to disconcert the Councils of the Enemy . . . 
and obtain large supplies of Cattle, Horses & Carriages." 
On the day he received these instructions from Burgoyne, 
Baum marched from Fort Edward southward to 
Fort Miller. Two days later he set out from Fort Miller to 
Saratoga. The 12th, he moved from Saratoga to Batten- 
kill, on the east side of the Hudson, and here halted to 
receive fresh instructions from Burgoyne. On the 13th, 
Baum slowly marched sixteen miles in twelve hours from 
Battenkill to Cambridge, which was on the direct road to 



198 stark's command at bennington 

Bennington and only eighteen miles distant from it. On 
this day, "thirty provincials and fifty savages" of Baum's 
force came into collision with two small bodies of Amer- 
icans and so gave warning of the nearness of the British. 
''Long before sunrise on the 14th," Baum's "little corps 
was under arms" with the "intention to march at once 
upon Bennington"; but he was delayed "at the farm . . . 
of Sankoik" on "the northern branch of the Hosac," 
where the retreating Americans had broken down the 
bridge. He therefore "bivouacked at the farm of Walam- 
scott, about four miles from Sankoick, and three from Ben- 
nington." On the 15th, Baum finding his outposts again 
attacked, sent back for reinforcemeuts, and fortified a posi- 
tion on a height to the left of "the farm of Walamscott." 
A few sentences from the stirring "Account of the Battle 
of Bennington," by Glich, give a clear-cut picture of the 
engagement as viewed by the Germans from their intrench- 
ments: 

"The morning of the sixteenth rose beautifully serene. 
. . . Colonel Baume . . . some how or other persuaded to 
beUeve, that the armed bands, of whose approach he was 
warned, were loyalists . . . found himself attacked in front 
and flanked by thrice his number . . , whilst the very 
persons in whom he had trusted, and to whom he had given 
arms, lost no time in turuing them against him. . . . When 
the heads of the columns began to show themselves in rear 
of our right and left . . . the Indians . . . lost all confi- 
dence and fled . . . leaving us more than ever exposed. 
. . . An accident . . . exposed us, almost defenceless, to 
our fate. The solitary tumbril, which contained the whole 
of our spare ammunition, became ignited, and blew up. 
For a few seconds the scene which ensued defies all power 
of language to describe. The bayonet, the butt of the 
rifle, the sabre, the pike, were in full play, and men fell as^ 
they rarely fall in modern warfare, under the direct blows 
of their enemies. . . . Col. Baume, shot through the body 
by a rifle ball, fell mortally wounded, and all order and 



STARK's command at BENNINGTON 199 

discipline being lost, flight or submission was alone 
thought of." 

From the letters of Baum and the picturesque account 
of Glich, we must turn, for the American story, to the 
terse dispatch of Stark to the New Hampshire authorities, 
written two days after the battle: 

"The 13^^^ I was inform'd that a party of Indians were 
at Cambridge ... I detached Col« Gregg with 200 men 
under his command to stop their march. In the evening I 
had information by express that there was a large body of 
theenemy on their way with their field pieces. , . . The 14*^ 
I marched with my Brigade & a few of this States' Militia, 
to oppose them and to cover Gregg's retreat. . . . About 
four miles from the Town [Bennington] I accordingly met 
him on his return, and the Enemy in close pursuit of him, 
within half a mile of his rear. ... I drew up my little 
army on an eminence in open view of their encampments, 
but could not bring them to an engagement. I marched 
back about a mile, and there encamp'd. . . . The 15* it 
rain'd all day; I sent out parties to harrass them. 

*'The i6th I was join'd by this States' Militia and those 
of Berkshire County; I divided my army into three Divis- 
ions, and sent Col. Nichols with 250 men on their rear of 
their left wing; Col°. Hendrick in the Rear of their right, 
with 300 men, order'd when join'd to attack the same. 

"In the mean time I sent 300 men to oppose the Enemy's 
front, to draw their attention that way; Soon after I 
detach'd the Colonels Hubbart & Stickney on their right, 
wing with 200 men to attack that part, all which plans had 
their desired effect. Col^' Nichols sent me word that he 
stood in need of a reinforcement, which I readily granted, 
consisting of 100 men, at which time he commenced the 
attack precisely at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, which was 
followed by all the rest. I pushed forward the remainder 
with all speed; our people behaved with the greatest spirit 
& bravery imaginable: Had they been Alexanders or 
Charleses of Sweden, they could not have behaved better. 



200 stark's command at bennington 

The action lasted two hours. ... I rec^ intelligence that 
there was a large reinforcement within two miles of us, on 
their march, which occasion'd us to renew our attack. But 
luckily for us Col^ Warner's Regiment came up, which put 
a stop to their career. . . . We used their own cannon 
against them. . . .At Sunset we obliged them to beat a 
second retreat. ... 

*'I have I Lieut. Col^ since dead, i major, 7 Captains, 
14 Lieut^ 4 Ensigns, 2 Cornets, i Judge advocate, i Bar- 
ron, 2 Canadian officers, 6 sergeants, i Aid-de-camp & 
seven hundred prisoners; — I almost forgot i Hessian 
Chaplain." 

In his tactics on the battle field. Stark showed the 
same qualities he had displayed in the general strategy of 
the campaign — quick insight and decision, followed by 
deliberate and stubborn action. At Bennington, just as at 
Bunker Hill and Trenton, Stark was quick to see the 
importance of flank movements, and cool in carrying them 
out. He was **as active in attack as he had then been 
obstinate in defense." Because he had insisted on the 
plan of a flank movement in the campaign preceding the 
battle. Stark had a force on the spot ready to oppose Baum 
and ''check Burgoyne." 

The battle of Bennington was won by the militia of 
New Hampshire, Vermont and Massachusetts, under the 
command of Stark. As we have already seen, Lincoln 
was at Half Moon on the Hudson the day of the battle, 
and was not in time, therefore, to return and co-operate 
with Stark and Warner. Stark and his troops would like- 
wise have been unable to return to Bennington, had he 
allowed them on the 7th of August to march to Stillwater 
as they had been ordered to do before he arrived at Man- 
chester and "chose to command himself." That there was 
any respectable force at Bennington capable of offering 
resistance to Baum is due to the resolute good sense of 
. Stark and of the Vermont Council of Safety, and to the 
terms of the independent command given Stark by the State 



STARk's command at BENNINGTON 201 

of New Hampshire. Had Schuyler's orders of the 4th and 
9th of August to Lincoln and the Vermont Council been 
carried out, the militia would have been on the Hudson 
more than twenty miles away, when Baum approached 
Bennington. The facts, then, as told by the participants 
fully substantiate the statement of Josiah Bartlett quoted 
at the beginning of this paper: 

"Had Gen^ Starks gone to Stillwater agreable to 
orders;, there would have been none to oppose Col. Baum 
in carrying Gen^ Burgoyne's orders into Execution." 

It is evident that Stark's fellow citizens and fellow 
soldiers of New Hampshire and Vermont understood the 
situation and had some substantial reasons for feeling that 
the independent command was justified both by the con- 
ditions which preceded it and by the results which followed. 

The unfavorable judgment of General Lincoln and of 
the Continental Congress remains to be discussed. The 
usual statement is that Stark, on his arrival at Manchester, 
was ordered by Schuyler to march to Stillwatet and refused 
to do so. Two facts which seem to have escaped notice 
show this statement to be a somewhat misleading half- 
truth. In the first place, Schuyler's orders were not to 
Stark; they were transmitted directly by Lincoln to Stark's 
brigade of milita without Stark's knowledge. Second 
Stark eventually acted in harmony with Schuyler; he 
started to march to the appointed rendezvous at Cambridge 
on the 13th when he received word that the enemy were 
already there; and on the i6th of September he did march 
to Stillwater, but he marched via Bennington, and after 
carrying out the flank attack desired by both Schuyler and 
Washington. 

Of the relations betweed Lincoln and Stark at Man- 
chester, Vermont, on the 7th of August, we have three 
accounts: one by Lincoln in a letter to Schuyler trans- 
mitted by the latter to Congress; one in a letter by Captain 
Peter Clark of Stark's brigade; and a newspaper account, 
which appeared in Stark's lifetime, "collected from the 



202 stark's command at bennington 

papers and conversations of the General by his son-in-law, 
B. F. Stickney, Esq." Stark's own account, contained in a 
letter written the 7th of August and acknowledged on the 
I2th by the New Hampshire Committee of Safety, cannot 
now be found. The nearest approach to Stark's story 
is therefore the version which appears to have been 
given by Stark to his family and published by his son-in- 
law in the Concord Patriot^ May 15, 18 10, twelve years 
before the general's death. This is also quoted verbatim in 
the "Biographical Sketch" published in the year of Stark's 
death in ''Farmer and Moore's Collections," and stated by 
them to be based on particulars given by Stark's oldest 
son Caleb and his son-in-law, Stickney. This contem- 
porary family account is as follows: 

"He [Stark] found the advantage of his independent 
command immediately upon his arrival at Manchester, for 
the packs of his men were paraded as for a march. He 
enquired for the cause, and was informed Gen. Lincoln had 
been there and had ordered them off to the Sprouts, at the 
mouth of Mohawk river. He sought for, and found Lin- 
coln, and demanded of him his authority for undertaking 
the command of his men. Lincoln said it was by order of 
General Schuyler. Stark desired him to tell Gen. Schuyler 
that he considered himself adequate to the command of 
his own men, and gave him copies of his commission and 
orders." 

This family version is corroborated by the testimony of 
one of Stark's captains, Peter Clark, of Lyndeboro, New 
Hampshire, who wrote his wife as follows: 

"Manchester [Vt.], August 6, 1777. 

. . . We have made us tents with boards but this 
moment we have had orders to march for Bennington and 
leave them, and from thence we are to march for Albany 
to join the Continental Army, and try to stop Burgoyne in 
his career. . . . 



STARK's command at BENNINGTON 203 

August 7, 1777. 

A few minutes after I finished my letter there was a 
considerable turn in affairs by reason of Gen.^ Stark arriv- 
ing in town. The orders we had for marching was given 
by General Lincoln — what passed between Lincoln and 
Stark is not known but by what we can gather together, 
Stark chooses to command himself. I expect we shall 
march for Bennington next Sabbath and where we shall go 
to from there I cannot tell." 

It was entirely natural for Stark to "choose to com- 
mand himself" the brigade which he had raised, and which 
he had been commissioned to command. It was also 
inevitable that the sturdy and quick tempered old Indian 
fighter should have felt affronted, when he found that his 
volunteer militia had been ordered off without his knowl- 
edge, and moreover that the order had been given by one 
of the men who had been made a major-general when 
Stark was passed over, the previous February, by Con- 
gress. Consequently, a strong personal feeling inevitably 
cropped out in the conversation between Lincoln and 
Stark; and this personal element was naturally emphasized 
in the following account sent by Lincoln to Schuyler. 

''Bennington, Aug.^* 3 th I'jyj, 

Dear General 

Yesterday Gen.^ Stark from New Hampshire came 
into camp at Manchester — by his Instructions from that 
State It is at his option to Act in Conjunction with the 
Continental Armey or not. He seems to be exceedingly 
soured and thinks he hath been neglected and hath 
not had Justice done him by Congress — he is determined 
not to join the Continental Armey untill the Congress 
give him his Rank therein — his Claim is to command all 
the Officers he Commanded last Year as also all those who 
joined the Armey after him. Whether he will march his 
Troops to Stillioater or not I am quite at a loss to know — 



204 stark's command at bennington 

but It he doth it is a fixed point with him to act there as a 
Seperate Chor and take no orders from any officer in the 
Northern Department saving your Honour for he saith 
they all were Either Commanded by him the last year 
or joined the Armey after him Its very unhappy that 
this matter by him is carried to so great a length espe- 
cially at at (sic) time when Every exertion for our Common 
Safety is so absolutely Necessary I have Good Reason to 
believe if the State of New Hampshire were Informed of 
the Matter they would give New and Very different In- 
structions to Gen.^ Starkes. The Troops from the Massa- 
chusetts are Collecting here I don't know what Number 
may be Expected. I suppose the Rear will be up tomorrow 
night at farthest I am Dear Sir with Regard and Esteam 
your most Obed.^ Humble Servt B. Lincoln." 

To Lincoln's letter Schuyler made immediate and 
tactful reply. ''You will please to assure General Stark 
that I have acquainted Congress of his situation, and that 
I trust and entreat he will, on the present and alarming 
crisis, waive his right, as the greater the sacrifice he makes 
to his feelings, the greater will be the honor due to him." 
Lincoln forwarded this letter to Stark with the generous 
endorsement: 'T can only subjoin my entreaties to his that 
you will not now, when every exertion for the common 
safety is necessary, suffer any consideration to prevent 
your affording him all the succour in your power." 

These three letters of Lincoln and Schuyler consti- 
tute the evidence left by them as to any lack of harmony 
with Stark. There is no reference to it by Schuyler in his 
defence before the court martial; none by Stark after the 
missing letter of the 7th of August; and none by Wash- 
ington in his correspondence. Stark and Schuyler knew 
and valued each other, and Lincoln acted honorably and 
tactfully. 

We have already seen that Schuyler was reconverted 
to the plan of a flank attack and planned to send Lincoln 



STARK's command at BENNINGTON 205 

to aid Stark in carrying it out. Stark also on his part 
shared the readiness to co-operate with Lincoln and Schuy- 
ler in a flank movement toward the Hudson. He began his 
march before the battle of Bennington and completed it after 
winning the victory. On the 8th of August, Stark advanced 
half way to Stillwater, marching some twenty miles south- 
west from Manchester, Vermont, to Bennington. On the 
13th, Stark was preparing to continue his march, appar- 
ently to Cambridge in pursuance of the plan agreed upon 
with Lincoln, when news came of the approach of Baum. 
On the 13th, says Captain Peter Clark, "the whole Brigade 
was paraded to march to Still Water and while under arms 
the General, received intelligence that there was a large 
body of the Enemy coming to destroy the stores at Ben- 
nington, whereupon the Brigade was dismissed." On 
receipt of Stark's letter of the same day, Lincoln replied: 
"As the troops were not on the march, I am glad you 
detained them in Bennington. ... If the enemy have 
possession of that place . . . [i. e. Cambridge] appoint 
another." The credit for this wise delay at Bennington 
Stark generously gave to the Vermont Council of Safety, 
with whom he evidently acted in fullest harmony. Two 
days after the battle, he wrote to the Hartford Courant as 
follows: 

**I received orders to march to- Manchester and act in 
conjunction with Col. Warner. After my arrival at that 
place I received orders from Major General Lincoln pur- 
suant to orders from General Schuyler, to march my whole 
brigade to Stillwater, and join the main army then under 
his command. At the same time requested the whole of 
the militia (by Gen. Schuyler's order) of the State of Ver- 
mont to join him and march to Stillwater as aforesaid. In 
obedience thereto I marched with my brigade to Benning- 
ton on my way to join him, leaving that part of the coun- 
try almost naked to the ravage of the enemy. The Hon- 
orable the Council then sitting at Bennington were much 
against my marching with my Brigade, as it was raised on 



206 stark's command at bennington 

their request, ,t,h.ey apprehending .great danger of the 
enemy's approaching to that place, which afterwards we 
found truly to be the case. They happily agreed to post- 
pone giving orders to the militia to march." . . - , 

Congress was not so well informed of the situation as 
were Sphuyler-.and Lincoln and the Vermont Council. 
The action of Congress was therefore neither particularly 
intelligent nor timely. The letter of the 8th of 'August 
from Lincoln to. Schuyler describing his meeting with 
Stark, already quoted above, was forwar4ed by Schuyler 
to Copgress,. Upon that body it made naturally , an 
impression that, \vas both unfavorable and false. The 
impression^ was unfavorable, since the letter , so, strongly 
emphasized the personal grievances of Stark and his criti- 
cism of Congress. The impression was false^ because, 
while not stating definitely the reasons for the actions jOf 
of New Hapipshire, the letter would give the casual or 
prejudiced reader the false idea that New Hampshire gave 
Stark the independent command. because he felt .he /'hath 
not haql justice done him by Congress." > In justice to 
Lincoln it should be remembered that he wrote under per- 
sonally irritating circumstances a personal letter intended 
for .Sghpylerand not for Congress. A more careful perusal 
of Lincoln's letter shows that it gives merely Stark's per- 
sonal attitude; it was not intended tp give and it did not 
give any indication of the reasons which led New Hamp- 
shire tp give Stark his independent command. The cause 
of .New Hampshire's action was not a private grievance, 
but a public necessity. To understand it we must turn 
from, the personal grievance described by Lincoln to the 
facts testified to by Josiah Bartlett and now printed for 
the first time. Unfortunately it was upon Lincoln's letter 
that .contemporary judgment of New Hampshire's action 
was based, and later writers have started from this false 
basis. The impression which that letter made upon a New 
Hampshire delegate in Congress is shown in the following 
shrewd comments- appended by George Frost to a copy of 



sI'ARk's' command Xt "be'nnington 207 

Lincoln's letter which he forwarded to the New Hamp- 
shire auth6rties. 

''The foregoing letter was Sent by GenJ Lincoln to 
Gen.^ Schoyler and by P. Schoyler to Congress which is 
Very alarming to Congress that Gen.^ Starkes should take 
Occasion to Resent any Supposed Affrunt by Congress to 
him when his Country lays at Stake, at the' same time 
would take notis that vO-e shall loos the benifet of our troops 
being 'put in the Continentall pay Except the Measures are 
alterd,'and woud also observe he don't refuse to put him- 
selfe under Gen.^ Schoyler who is Recarled from that com- 
mand and Congress has given the Command of the Armey 
to "Gen. 1 Gates, w^^ I suppose Gel. Starkes knew liot of at 
that time, as to the' promotion of Officers in -the Armey 
the Congress went on a new plan agreaed on in Baltirriore 
(at the Raising the as it Called Standing Armey) that 
Every State Should in Some measure have their propor- 
tion of Gen.* Officers according to the Troops they Raised 
by which Reason som officers was superseded or as they 
call affronted." ' - 

Under the misleading impression derived from Lin^ 
coin's letter to Schuyler, Congress on the 19th of August; 
three days after Stark's indehdent instructions had enabled 
him to render effective aid "to the common cause," passed 
the following vote of censure, in complete ignorance of the 
victory at Bennington: ' 

^'Mesolved^ That a copy of general Lincoln's letter be 
forthwith transmitted to the council of NeW-Harnpshire, 
and that they be informed, that the insti^uctions which gen- 
eral Stark says he has received from them are destructive 
of military subordination and highly prejudicial to the corn- 
mon cause at this crisis; and therefore thkt they be desired 
to instruct general Stark to conform himself to the sarhe 
rules which other general officers of the militia are subject 
to whenever they are called out at the expence of the 
United States." 



208 stark's command at bennington 

In the debate on this resolution, the New Hampshire 
delegates defended her action, on the basis of reasons con- 
tained in a letter from Josiah Bartlett. "The militia of 
that State had lost all confidence in the General Officers 
who had the command at Tyconderoga . . . they would not 
turn out nor be commanded by such officers; the preserva- 
tion of the lives of the inhabitants on our frontlets . . . 
made such orders at that critical time absolutely necessary; 
we were not about to justify General Stark for making a 
demand of rank in the army at that critical time, but we 
well knew he had a great deal to say for himself on that 
head, and had . . . distinguished himself, while others 
were advanced over his head. . . . We informed Congress 
that we had not the least doubt but the first battle they 
heard of from the North would be fought by Stark and 
the troops commanded by him. . . . Judge of our feelings, 
when the very next day we had a confirmation of what we 
had asserted by an express from General Schuyler giving 
an Account of the victory obtained by General Stark and 
the troops under his command. We believe this circum- 
stance only will make those easy who have been trying to 
raise a dust in Congress." 

The vote of censure by Congress was certainly ill- 
timed; probably it would have never been proposed had 
Congress waited one day longer. On the 4th of October, 
Congress was better informed and passed a vote that was 
more generous and more just, 

^'Resolved^ That the thanks of Congress be presented 
to general Stark of the New-Hampshire militia, and the 
officers and troops under his command, for their brave and 
successful attack upon, and signal victory over, the enemy 
in their lines at Bennington; and that brigadier Stark be 
appointed a brigadier general in the army of the United 
States." 

The New Hampshire instructions to Stark were doubt- 
less in theory "destructive of military subordination"; but 
"military subordination" had to yield to the more imper- 



Stark's command at bennington 209 

ative necessity of a military force capable of ''the preser- 
vation of the lives of the inhabitants on our frontiers." 
At that memorable three days' session in July, 1777, the 
members of the New Hampshire General Court and of the 
Committee of Safety were confronted, not with a ques- 
tion of rank, but with the far more vital one of self-preser- 
vation. They knew that a brigade could not be raised in 
face of the universal loss of confidence in the generals of 
the Northern Department, and of the fear that any militia 
would be called to the ''southward," away from the threat- 
ened frontier. They had been summoned in extra session 
not in response to calls for continental troops but to 
answer the cry of distress from their Vermont neighbors. 
They knew that men would volunteer promptly to serve 
under Stark and that he was admirably fitted by nature and 
experience to manage such a volunteer militia unhampered 
by restrictions. They therefore left it to his discretion 
whether he should join with continental troops or not. 

The peculiar instructions giving Stark an independent 
command seem admirably adapted to meet the peculiar 
exigencies of the situation. That they were so adapted is 
proven by the results which followed. Stark's independent 
command enabled him, first, to recruit a brigade of 1,492 
officers and men in six days, and to move forward at once, 
knowing his volunteers would follow without hesitation; 
second, to insist on a flank attack, based on sound 
strategy; third, to reconvert Schuyler to this sound 
strategy; fourth, to co-operate with militia from Vermont 
and Massachusetts in retaining at Bennington a force suffi- 
cient to check Baum and win the battle of Bennington; 
and finally to restore confidence and then to march with 
victorious troops to Stillwater and Saratoga. 

Without the independent command, the presence of 
Stark and his brigade at Bennington was an impossibility. 
Without Stark and his brigade, the victory at Bennington 
was impossible. Without Bennington, who can say what 
a difference there might have been at Saratoga.? It is 



210 STARK's command at BENNINGTON 

^^unnecessary to enlarge upon the importance of the Battle 
of Bennington; it has been recognized from that day to 
this by both American and British contestants and his- 
torians. It is enough to refer to Washington's estimate of 
what he called "the great stroke struck by Gen. Stark near 
Bennington''; and to the judgment of the latest and most 
epigrammatic of the English historians of the Revolution^ 
"Bennington . . . proved to be the turning point of the 
; Saratoga campaign which was the turning point of the 
i/war." To one who examines carefully the records of that 
i day or the judgments of this, Stark's independent com- 
mand appears a turning point not only in a decisive battle, 
but also in a decisive campaign, and in an epoch-making 
movement. To the sober' second thought of his day or 
of ours, Stark's independent command seems warranted by 
its deep-seated Causes arid justified by its far-reaching 
results. ■' ' '■■' 

We have followed the story of Statk's campaign as 
told by participants and eontertiporaties. It is a tale of 
swift preparation, strategic delay, and intrepid attack. 

Stark "chose to comrriand himself" the army which he 
had raised himself; but he felt he acted in accord with 
Schuyler, as well as in fulfillment of the terms of his inde- 
pendent command. The responsibility for granting that 
command must be shared by the public sentiment which 
demanded it, the General Court which voted it, and the 
general who accepted it. The credit for the sound judgment 
which led to the wise delay at Bennington must be given 
to Stark and the Vermont Council of Safety. The final 
accord in plans is due to the wise and eventually harmoni- 
ous action of Schuyler of New York, and Lincoln of 
Massachusetts, as well as of Stark of New Hampshire and 
Warner of Vermont. Schuyler and Stark supplemented 
each other admirably both in personal characteristics and in 
manner of conducting a campaign; Lincoln helped to pre- 
vent a rupture between them; the Berkshire militia and 
Parson Allen were just in time for the fighting on which 



Stark's command at bennington 211 

they insisted; Warner and the Vermont men and supplies 
and especially the timely reinforcements against Breyman 
were essential to both the campaign and the final engage- 
ment. The final result was so creditable that there was 
credit enough for all concerned. The plans and prepar- 
ations of Schuyler and the Vermont Council were essen- 
tial to Stark's opportunity; Stark's power to take advantage 
of that opportunity was due to his independent command. 

Stark's independent command was in historic harmony 
with the unfortunate but inevitable conditions which he 
had to m^eet; with the task he had to perform; and with 
the characteristics of the man and his contemporaries. 
Personal independence and self-assertiveness were the dis- 
tinguishing characteristics of the frontiersman and Indian 
fighter, and of his troops whom he so aptly described as 
f'undisciplined freemen . . . men that had not learned the 
art of submission, nor had they been trained to the art of 
war." These were also the distinctive characteristics of 
the frontier life of colonial New Hampshire and Vermont, 
and of the period of the Revolution. The conditions 
which necessitated the independent command are much to 
be regretted; but so also are the conditions which necessi- 
tated the Revolution. 

The Bennington campaign brings out sharply the 
strength and weakness of the Revolutionary era, when the 
newly born American nation was passionately devoted to 
the idea of liberty, but had not yet learned to understand 
and love the idea of union. It was in the next generation 
that a son of one of Stark's captains knit the two ideas 
together and kindled men's imaginations with the concep- 
tion of ^'liberty and union." 

In its illustration of the temper of the Revolution lies 
perhaps the chief value of this story, told by the men of 
that day, of their month of swift and triumphant compaign, 
from the i8th of July at Exeter when Speaker John Lang- 
don gave his pledge and prophecy, to the i6th of August 
when General John Stark fulfilled the prophecy and 
"checked Burgoyne." 



Cteminisfcente of O^eneral ^tatk 



An extract from the diary of Elder James Randall, written in 
August, 1807. 



M 



UGUST seventh, I arrived at Derryfield, N. H., and 
dined with General Stark, the Revolutionary 
patriot, whose name as a hero will ever be dear to 
Americans. We had much conversation on the subject of 
religion. 

The interview was very interesting to me. I availed 
myself of the privilege of opening my mind freely, and 
labored much to show the general my views of the way of 
salvation, and of the necessity of regeneration. The gen- 
eral, being affected with the remarks, exclaimed, "You are 
not what formalists and bigots call a Christian!" *'And," 
continued he, *Tf it were not for four things, which those 
called Christians hold, namely, anarchy, avarice, superstition, 
and tradition I should be a Christian." "Why, sir," I 
replied, "I hate all those things, and yet I am a Christian." 
The general, in a flood of tears, exclaimed, "God bless you! 
God bless you! God bless you!" and said, "I am an old man 
of eighty years, and shall stay here but a little while, but 
my wife is younger than I, and will probably outlive me,* 
and I shall charge her and my son ever to receive you and 
treat you respectfully." 

I thanked him, and gave him the parting hand, but not 
without shedding some tears. 



*Mrs. Stark died in 181 5. 



212 



o^eneral 3of)n ^tark 

By Robert R. Law 

This article, as well as "The Battle of Bennington" and "Stark's 
Independent Command at Bennington," was prepared for and published 
by The New York State Historical Society. It was written in 1904. — 
Editor, 

/^^ii^HE colonists fought the battle of Bennington 
* ^J . according to the plans and under the immediate 
^^^ direction of Gen. John Stark. To him history 
has rightfully given the credit for the success which 
crowned their efforts, that memorable i6th of August, one 
hundred and twenty-seven years ago. His name and that 
of Bennington are united in the minds of all students of 
history, and to understand the success of the Americans 
in that famous engagement, one must know John Stark. 

What was the character, — the mental and moral qual- 
ities — of this pioneer, patriot and partisan leader.? 

To understand that character, rugged, strong and nat- 
ural as his own New Hampshire mountains, it is necessary 
to examine his heredity, environment and training, and 
those manifestations of his beliefs, and of his likes and 
dislikes, which were evidenced by his acts and words in 
thie various crises of his life. 

It is not my purpose in this paper to give a connected 
detailed and exhaustive account of General Stark, but 
rather, by selected characteristic incidents and utterances, 
make you acquainted with his personality. 

The principle which dominated his life was a sturdy 
and unbending independence, happily tempered by strong 
common sense and a devotion to duty. 

When Congress in the Spring of 1777 failed to give 
Stark the recognition he believed his services merited, 

213 



214 GENERAL JOHN STARK 

that spirit of independence led him to resign his commis- 
sion and return to his home, declaring that an officer who 
would not maintain his rank and assert his own rights, 
could not be trusted to vindicate those of his country. 
Yet, at the same time, his devotion to the cause of free- 
dom impelled him to fit out and send to the front all the 
members of his family who were old enough to join the 
army. 

This trait of his character, independence, was again 
manifested, when having accepted the command of the 
militia, in the summer of 1777, on condition that he should 
be accountable only to the authorities of New Hampshire, 
he refused to obey the order of General Lincoln and join 
Schuyler west of the Hudson. The result at Bennington 
justified his act of insubordination, and proved both his 
loyalty and his military wisdom. 

This independence, amounting in youth to intolerance 
of restraint, at the time of the battle of Bennington, had 
been tempered by the experience of years. He then 
lacked but a few days of being forty-nine years old, having 
been born at Londonderry, New Hampshire, August 28, 
1728. This attribute of character was his natural posses- 
sion, both by heredity and environment. 

Tacitus says of the inhabitants of ancient Germany, 
that their love of liberty was so strong that such a thing as 
obedience was unknown among them. They chose a 
leader or war chief by universal suffrage, but each indi- 
vidual reserved the right to be master of his own conduct. 

It is known that in 1495, the Duchess of Burgundy, 
widow of Charles the Bold, sent a body of German soldiers 
to invade England in support of the claim of one of the 
pretenders to the throne of Henry VH. The invaders 
were defeated, and those who survived fled to Scotland and 
were protected by the Scottish king. Among the German 
soldiers who remained in Scotland were men named Stark, 
and they are supposed to be the ancestors of General 
Stark. Be that as it may, his father Archibald Stark, a 



GENERAL JOHN STARK 215 

native of Glasgow and a graduate of her university, hold- 
ing religious views differing from those of the reigning 
monarch, James the First, emigrated with others of like 
belief, to Londonderry in Ireland. 

After a few years' residence there, becoming dissat- 
isfied with the institution of tithes and rents, these Scotch- 
Irish Presbyterians sought the greater freedom of the 
New World. They landed in Maine and made their way 
to the then frontier, establishing a settlement which they 
named Londonderry, in memory of their place of abode in 
Ireland. 

With such heredity, restiveness under restraint might 
be expected; and in addition to that, Stark's early life and 
associations were such as to inspire him with a feeling of 
self-confidence, and the habit of mind of forming and exe- 
cuting his own plans, rather than of accepting blindly the 
directions of others. The home of his youth was on the 
outskirts of the settlements, in constant danger of Indian 
forays, and where his mother often stood guard with a 
rifle while the men were working in the fields.* 

When he was twenty-four years of age, he was cap- 
tured by the St. Francis Indians, and won the hearts of 
his captors by his fearlessness and resource. When made 
to run the gantlet, he snatched a club from the nearest 
warrior in the line and laid about him so lustily, that he 
escaped with little injury, and left many tokens of his 
prowess on the persons of the Indians, to the great amuse- 
ment of the old men of the tribe who were spectators. 
When put at the squaw's work hoeing corn, he cut up the 
plants and left the weeds, and finally threw the hoe in the 



*This statement is not literally true, for while this section of the 
frontier was frequently threatened with an attack from the Indians, no 
actual danger came to the settlers about Amoskeag Falls, where the 
Starks lived. This was due, however, mainly to the vigor with which 
these sturdy pioneers waged their warfare elsewhere. It may not be out 
of place to remark that rifles were not in use in the early days of 
S tark . — Editor. 



216 GENERAL JOHN STARK 

river, thus showing the Indians that he possessed the true 
idea of the dignity of a warrior, and he was made chief of 
the tribe. 

His early military training was such as to develop and 
strengthen his love of independent action, 

Robert Rogers, the famous leader of the rangers, 
selected Stark as one of the lieutenants of his company, 
when it was organized in 1755, for service in the French 
and Indian War. This was a compliment to the young 
lieutenant's strength, endurance, woodcraft and fidelity, for 
none were enlisted in that chosen band but those who 
knew the woods, and who could be trusted with entire con- 
fidence in any situation. 

Stark's company was stationed at Fort Edward when 
the French under Baron Dieskau and the English under 
Gen. William Johnson fought the battle near this place, 
September 8, 1755, which resulted in the defeat of the 
French. Other results of the battle were the death of 
Col. Ephraim Williams, founder of Williams College, 
whose monument can be seen in the defile south of this 
village; the attaching of the names French Mountain and 
Bloody Pond to familiar features of the landscape, and the 
title of baronet to Sir William Johnson. 

This battle closed the campaign, and Stark saw no 
more active service till 1757. On January 15, of that year, 
Major Robert Rogers, with a company of seventy-four 
rangers. Stark being present as first heutenant, left their 
station at Fort Edward and marched to Fort William 
Henry, where they spent two days preparing snowshoes 
and provisions for an excursion to Ticonderoga. On the 
17th they proceeded down Lake George on the ice, camp- 
ing that night on the east shore near what is now known 
as Pearl Point. The weather was so severe and the travel- 
ing so difficult that it took the party the next three days 
to reach a point three miles from Lake Champlain. The 
next day, January 21, they reached that lake halfway 
between Crown Point and Ticonderoga. Seeing some 



GENERAL JOHN STARK 217 

sleds advancing over the ice in the distance, Rogers pur- 
sued them and took several prisoners, from whom he 
learned there was a large force of French and Indians at 
Ticonderoga. Knowing those who escaped would give the 
enemy intelligence of his approach, and that an immediate 
attack would follow, Major Rogers gave orders to his men 
to retreat as quickly as possible to the place they had occu- 
pied the night before, where the fires were still burning, 
and where they could dry their guns, as it was raining. 

After the custom of the rangers, they commenced the 
march in single file, Rogers in front, Stark in the rear. 
Suddenly, after a mile had been traversed, on ascending a 
hill, they found themselves face to face with two hundred 
men drawn up in the form of a crescent. The straggling 
line of rangers was not twenty feet from the enemy when 
they received the first fire. Rogers was soon wounded, 
and the command devolved upon Stark, who rallied the 
men and held off the enemy. When some of his men 
proposed retreat, he threatened to shoot the first man who 
attempted it; when his gunlock was shattered by a bullet, 
he sprang forward and wrenched a gun from the dying 
grasp of a Frenchman, who was shot through the body, 
and renewed the battle. Thus they continued to fight in 
snow four feet deep, until the cold January night came on, 
and the enemy withdrew. Then the retreat of the 
Rangers began, and at dawn they had reached Lake 
George. It was impossible for the wounded to go farther 
on foot, and Stark, with two men, proceeded on snowshoes 
to Fort William Henry, over the ice, reaching there at 
evening. 

Without stopping to rest, he started back, with a 
sleigh and a small reinforcing party, reaching his men the 
next morning, and bringing the party to the fort that 
evening. 

After having marched and fought all one day, then 
retreated all one night, he travelled on foot and over snow 
and ice, without stopping to rest, one hundred and twenty 



218 GENERAL JOHN STARK 

miles in less than forty hours. As a feat of endurance 
alone, it has seldom been equalled. 

In the month of March, 1757, Captain Stark, who was, 
in the absence of Major Rogers, in command of the 
rangers at Fort William Henry, gave evidence of his 
shrewdness and vigilance. While going the rounds the 
night before St. Patrick's Day, he heard some of the 
rangers planning to celebrate the occasion. There were 
many Irish among the regular troops, as well as among the 
rangers, and Stark foresaw the danger to which the post 
would be exposed at the close of the day, spent in excess 
and intoxication. 

He therefore gave orders to the sutler that no spirit- 
uous liquors should be issued to his rangers, except on 
written orders signed by himself, and when applied to for 
those orders he pleaded a lameness of the wrist as an 
excuse for not giving them. Thus the evening of St. 
Patrick's Day found the rangers sober, though the regulars 
had celebrated in the usual way. The French knowing 
the Irish custom calculated that the garrison would be in 
no condition to defend the fort, and made a night attack, 
but were repulsed by John Stark and his ready rangers. 

In 1758, Captain Stark in command of a company of 
Major Rogers' rangers, was a part of that army of 16,000 
men who under General Abercrombie and the brilliant 
Lord Howe, made the disastrous campaign against the 
French at Ticonderoga. 

Ten thousand American and 6,000 English regular 
soldiers, gathered at Fort Gage, south of this village; their 
camp extending to the base of the mountains and covering 
all the level land; and on the evening of July 4 of that 
year all the stores were loaded into the boats which lined 
the beach at the head of the lake. At sunrise Saturday, 
July 5, 1758, the army sailed for the north. There were 
900 bateaux, or flat-bottom boats, over thirty feet long, 135 
whale boats, besides many large flat-bottomed boats for 
artillery. The English regular soldiers with their scarlet 



GENERAL JOHN STARK 219 

coats were in the center, the Americans in blue, when uni- 
formed at all, on either side. It was a beautiful mid-sum- 
mer day, and Lake George has never before or since seen 
so imposing a pageant. 

With flags flying, bugles and bagpipes playing, it was 
all the pomp and circumstances of glorious war. When 
the last boat left the shore, the foremost had reached 
Diamond Island, and the intervening water seemed entirely 
covered. When the Narrows was reached and it became 
necessary to stretch out into lines, the flotilla extended 
over a space of six miles. Late in the afternoon they 
reached a point on the west shore where a landing was 
made, and from whence they left at an early hour Sabbath 
morning for Ticonderoga. This landing place was called 
by them Sabbath Day Point, which name it retains to this 
day. That night Lord Howe called Captain Stark to his 
tent and learned from him all he knew of Ticonderoga and 
its surroundings. 

Of the death of Lord Howe at the first volley; of the 
indecision and bad management of General Abercrombie, 
or **Mrs. Nabby Cromby," as he was derisively called by 
his men; of the useless sacrifice of life and the failure of 
the expedition, it is not necessary to speak, except to say 
that the rangers were the first to advance and the last to 
retreat, justifying in every respect the confidence reposed 
in them. 

When news of the conflict at Concord and Lexington 
was received. Stark was at work in his sawmill. Without 
waiting to go home to put on a coat, he jumped upon a 
horse, sending word to his wife to forward his regimentals 
to Medford, and in ten minutes' time was on his way to 
the front, arousing volunteers at every farmhouse and ham- 
let. During the years following the French and Indian 
War, he had been active and and influential in urging upon 
the people of his colony the necessity of military prepar- 
ation, and the guns at Lexington found him ready for 
action. 



220 GENERAL JOHN STARK 

One of the most prominent features of Stark's life is 
the absolute confidence reposed in him by his soldiers. 

The rangers in border conflict, the militia behind the 
rail fence at Bunker Hill, his men leading the attack at 
Trenton or storming the battery at Bennington, followed 
Stark with an unhesitating obedience and a devoted loyalty. 
He was a plain, blunt man, but they knew his bravery, 
they believed in his military skill. When General Gage 
was asked at Boston if the Americans would stand the 
assault of the royal troops, he replied they would if one 
John Stark were among them, for he was a brave fellow, 
and had served under him at Lake George in 1758 and 

1759- 

His rule of military action was that battles were won 
by fighting, yet was his zeal tempered by prudence and 
forethought. When urged to move the men of his regi- 
ment forward faster at Bunker Hill, he refused to do so, 
saying, "one fresh man in battle is better than ten who 
are fatigued;" and when his men were in line and eager to 
attack, he made them reserve their fire "until they could 
see the enemies' gaiters." But when Washington was 
planning his desperate attack upon Trenton, Colonel 
Stark's advice in council was, *'Your men have long been 
accustomed to place dependence upon spades and pick for 
safety, but if you ever mean to establish the independence 
of the United States you must teach them to rely upon 
firearms." And to the fighting parson at Bennington who 
complained of inaction, he said, *'If the Lord will once 
more give us sunshine, and I do not give you fighting 
enough, I will never ask you to come out again." And his 
remark later on the same day, in reference to the possible 
widowhood of Molly Stark, not only made a very worthy 
woman forever famous in American history, but displayed 
in an emphatic way, the keynote of Stark's character as a 
fighting man. 

Whether his mind had received the proper training for 
the grand strategy of war, and the management of large 



GENERAL JOHN STARK 221 

masses of troops, may be an open question; but in battle 
where the combatants were within his view, and under the 
conditions of warfare existing at that day he was a match- 
less leader. 

In person General Stark was of medium height, well 
proportioned, was smoothly shaven, and of a thoughtful 
and somewhat severe expression of countenance. In 
youth he was noted for strength, activity, and ability to 
endure fatigue. 

With these few strokes I have endeavored to draw a 
portrait of the American leader at Bennington. 

Of his subsequent services in the War of the Revolu- 
tion, I shall say little. 

As general in charge of the Northern department, 
with headquarters at Albany, in 1778, he was a faithful 
officer; as Washington's representative in New England in 
1779 and 1780, soliciting recruits and supplies, the confi- 
dence placed in him by the people made success assured; 
as commander-in-chief of the Northern department in 
1 78 1, with headquarters at Saratoga, he restored order and 
made life and property safe, where before it had been at the 
mercy of bands of plunderers; and when the war was over 
he returned to his modest New Hampshire home, honored 
by all his countrymen, a true Cincinnatus, though as might 
be expected from our study of his character, a bitter oppo- 
nent of the Order of the Cincinnati. 

His private life was simple and above reproach. He 
was considered stern and unbending. In the heat of the 
action at Bunker Hill, it was reported to Stark that his son 
was killed. He remarked to the person who brought the 
information that it was no time to talk of private affairs, 
when the enemy was in front. 

Happily the report was untrue, but it illustrates the 
spirit of the man. 

There was another and a tender side to his nature, 
evidenced by his great love of pets, and by his habitual use 
of nicknames. He bestowed one of the latter upon each 



222 GENERAL JOHN STARK 

member of his family, and thus his wife Elizabeth became 
Molly. 

She died when the general was eighty-four years of 
age. At her funeral the minister in his remarks referred 
to the general in a complimentary manner. Rapping 
sharply upon the floor with his cane, the old warrior said, 
*'Tut, tut, no more of that an it please you." And as the 
funeral procession left the house, too feeble to accom- 
pany it, he tottered into his room, saying sadly, "Good bye, 
Molly, we sup no more together on earth." 

Ten years later, on the 8th of March, 1822, at the age 
of ninety-four, John Stark died. Above the grave of this 
brave, honest, incorruptible patriot, on the banks of the 
Merrimack, which he loved so well, stands a fitting monu- 
ment, a plain shaft of New Hampshire granite, with the 
simple inscription: 

"MAJOR-GENERAL STARK." 



CtecoEections! of tlje 01& i^anotjer 
Street Cfjurct 

Extracts from a Paper by Deacon John Kimball 

The following article was furnished by Mr. Francis B. Eaton a few 
years ago, with the succeeding note: "In my younger days, when old 
Derryfield was emerging from its chrysalis state, we country people 
mostly had formed opinions as to the condition of things here and here- 
about not much higher than we might have had for the cities of the 
plain, Sodom and Gomorah. The Parker murder seemed to cap the 
climax. Mr. Kimball's paper of local interest shows some good New 
England influences at work in in the foundation of our Queen City of to- 
day, and that all was not then so black as it was painted." The author 
of the "Recollections" was for some time President of the Central Congre- 
gational Club of New Hampshire, and the article was read before one of 
its meetings. — Editor. 

IXTY years ago I left my country home in Boscawen 
and took up my abode in this city. My mother 
had heard Dr. Wallace preach at a series of meet- 
ings held in that town. She earnestly requested me on 
leaving to be sure to become a regular attendant at the 
Hanover Street Church under his pastoral care. On the 
Sunday after my arrival I went to the old church situated 
nearer Elm Street, then the new church. On entering I 
was met by Mr. Moulton, the sexton. I informed him I 
had come to stay awhile and wanted a regular seat. He 
replied that he would find a seat for me that day and dur- 
ing the week would see if he could secure a regular seat. 
On the second Sunday I was shown into a pew occupied 
by an old gentleman and his family. His name was Eben 
Foster. The pew was the first on the east end of the 
church next to the pulpit. Mrs. Foster had a sister living 
in Boscawen, who was an intimate friend of my mother. 
In order to properly engage in the service it became neces- 

223 



224 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE OLD HANOVER ST. CHURCH 

sary to procure a Hymn Book, which I found at a book- 
store on Elm street. I had my name printed in gold let- 
ters on the cover. I have carefully kept the book until 
this time. It is what is known as "Watts's Select." In 
the first part is Psalms, numbering 150, just the same num- 
ber as is in the Bible, — written by Dr. Isaac Watts, 
who has written about 600 Psalms and hymns. Many of 
them are in use to-day. Dr. Watts was a dissenting 
clergyman and preached in the city of London about the 
year 1700. Later he changed to Southhampton. One 
morning he looked over the arm of the sea which sepa- 
rates the mainland from the Isle of Wight, and beholding 
its beauty he wrote: 

"Sweet fields beyond the swelling flood 
Stand dressed in living green; 
So to the Jews old Canaan stood 
While Jordan rolled between." 

Next in the book were Books I, II and III. Later, 
at the end, were added, ''Select Hymns" by different 
authors, which were inserted to keep the book "up to 
date." 

I had a friend who desired a seat with me. He was 
from Gilmanton, and as Dr. Wallace prepared for the min- 
istry at the seminary there my friend had known of him. 
His name was Nehemiah Sleeper Bean. I am glad to 
know that his respected son is a prominent member of this 
society. 

I had another friend who attended the same church. 
He occupied a seat in the choir and played a brass instru- 
ment to assist in the music. He was from Canterbury, 
and his father was a deacon in the church there under the 
pastoral care of the Rev. William Patrick. His name was 
Thomas Ham. He died last year in Laconia, at the 
advanced age of eighty-four. 

To digress a little, Mr. Patrick was a Scotch-Irish 
minister from Londonderry. He used "Watts's Select" in 
his church in Canterbury, and always commenced the ser- 



RECOLLECTIONS OF THE OLD HANOVER ST. CHURCH 225 

vice in the forenoon by saying, "Let us commence the 

worship of God this morning by singing to his praise 

Psalm." In the afternoon he would say, "Let us resume 

the worship of God this afternoon in the use of 

Hymn of the Selection." During a visit to Constanti- 
nople, in 1895, I i^^t his granddaughter, Miss Mary 
Patrick, a native of Canterbury, who is the distinguished 
president of the American College for Girls at Scutari. 
At the installation of President Hadley of Yale College, a 
few years ago, Miss Patrick was honored by occupying a 
seat on the platform with the other presidents of American 
colleges. 

I occasionally attended evening meetings, which were 
held in southwest corner of the church. There was no 
chapel, as the stove which was used for heating the church 
was located there. Generally there were not more than 
twenty or thirty present. Deacon Hiram Brown was 
usually there. He was a man easily approached and 
always had a kind word for strangers. He was the first 
mayor of the city. The last time I met him was in the 
city of Washington, where he had charge of the grounds 
around the Executive Mansion during the administration 
of President Johnson. He gave me a cordial greeting. 
Another brother was Deacon Baldwin, who generally took 
charge of the meetings. Had I met him in Canterbury, I 
should have supposed he would be classed as a Freewill 
Baptist. When the spirit of the meeting would lag a little, 
the deacon would sing a hymn commencing, 

"Come blooming youth and seek the truth and on to glory go," etc. 

He was an earnest, loyal deacon. 

On entering the church and walking up the east 
aisle, I passed the pew of Samuel D. Bell, who was a con- 
stant attendant. He was afterwards chief justice of the 
Supreme court of the state. One of the prominent men 
who was a constant worshiper was Robert Reed, agent of 
the Amoskeag Company, a particular friend of the pastor, 



226 RECOLLECTIONS OF THE OLD HANOVER ST. CHURCH 

also David Gillis, agent of the Manchester Mills, and 
William G. Means, father of the late Charles T. Means. 
His voice was frequently heard in the prayer-meetings. I 
was particularly pleased with Mr. Means, because he was 
the paymaster on the Amoskeag, where I met him every 
four weeks. I early made the acquaintance of Frederick 
Smyth. He was prominent in all church matters. I 
retained friendly relations with him in the numerous public 
positions to which he was afterw^ards called. I was 
selected to act as one of the bearers at his burial. 

During my residence in the city, I met a friend and 
relative, who attended the Hanover Street Church. She, 
too, came from Canterbury. Subsequently she became 
the wife of Dr. William W. Brown. Of her history you 
are all well informed. She left her property to support 
the Children's Home. 

I will mention only one more, Brother Charles Hutch- 
inson, in whose family I resided. Mrs. Hutchinson was a 
decided Methodist, so to make all harmonious they attended 
the Hanover Street Church in the forenoon and the Meth- 
odist Church in the afternoon. It was Mr. Hutchinson 
who invited me to join a Sunday-school class. I was 
introduced to Mr. Payson, who was a teacher in one of the 
public schools. His class was in the gallery. Mr. Payson 
said I must provide myself with a copy of "Bane's Notes 
on the Gospels," and a question book to match. (Quar- 
terlies were not in use then.) I found Mr. Payson to be 
an excellent teacher. In all my sixty years of Sunday- 
school life, I never knew a better. 

During my stay in Manchester, I became strongly 
attached to Dr. Wallace. He frequently preached in the 
South Church in Concord, where he always met with a 
cordial welcome. 



ji^otes! ifrom an a^ih-Mimt ^i^tovv 



M 



MONG the American geographies and gazetteers of 
a hundred years ago, that by the Rev. Jedidiah 
Morse, a native of Wethersfield, Conn., and 
for many years a resident of Charlestown, Mass., for a 
quarter of a century stood at the head. A reader of 
one of these old-time books finds many interesting com- 
parisons with our present situations. Some of its state- 
ments are somewhat startling, for example, where it says 
in speaking of the rivers and bridges of the state that "A 
bridge has been erected over Amoskeag falls 656 feet in 
length and 80 feet wide, supported by five piers. And 
what is remarkable, this bridge was rendered passable for 
travelers in 57 days after it was begun." 

The history mentions as the principal towns of the 
state at that time, 1804, the following, with their popula- 
tion:^ Portsmouth, 5,339; Exeter, 1,727; Concord, 2,052; 
Dover, 2,042; Durham, 1,126; Amherst, 2,150; Keene, 
1,646; Charlestown 1,364; Haverhill, 805; Plymouth, 743. 
' There was no Manchester in the state at that time,( 
and Derryfield had not risen to sufficient importance to 
find honorable mention. 

Portsmouth is described as the principal town in the 
state, it being situated about two miles from the sea on the 
south side of the Piscataqua river. It contained 500 
houses and nearly as many other buildings. In a brief 
sketch of Concord it says: ^'Concord is a pleasant, flourish- 
ing town. The general court of late has commonly held 
sessions there, and from its central situation and a thriv- 
ing back country it will probably become the permanent 
seat of government. Much of the trading of the upper 
Coos centers in the town." 

227 



228 NOTES FROM AN OLD-TIME HISTORY 

Speaking of trade and manufacture it says that the 
inhabitants in the southwestern section of the state gener- 
ally carried their producte to Boston. In the middle and 
northern section, as far as the lower Coos, they trade at 
Portsmouth. Above the Lower Coos there were no con- 
venient roads direct to the seacoast. The people on the 
upper branches of the Saco river found their nearest mar- 
ket at Portland, in the district of Maine, and thither the 
inhabitants of upper Coos have generally carried their 
produce, some have gone in the other direction to New 
York markets. The people in the country generally manu- 
factured their own clothing and considerable quantities of 
tow cloth for exportation. The other manufactures were 
pot and pearl ashes, maple sugar, bricks and pottery and 
some iron, not sufficient, however, for home consumption, 
though it might be made an article of exportation. 

It is worthy of statement that the eldest son of this 
pioneer of historians in our country, Samuel Finley Breese 
Morse, artist and inventor, for some time in his early man- 
hood was a resident of Manchester, and the reader is 
referred to the article in this volume of "The Art and 
Artists of Manchester." 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: April 2010 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN COLLECTIONS PRESERVATION 

111 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



